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COMMENT
Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict
Products Liability
Morris G. Shanker*
Why must the legal mind look so desperately for an exclusive
pigeonhole? Has not the time come to recognize that the busi-
ness of law is to determine liability between people and not to
place their claims in pigeonholes?
0 1 WROTE IN 1965.1 If there is wisdom in these words, the
Ohio Supreme Court fails to perceive it. Twice, - first in
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.2 and now in United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equipment Co.' - the Ohio
Supreme Court has declared that the extent of a seller's strict liabil-
ity4 for selling defective products depends upon whether the plain-
tiff's claim is pigeonholed as a "contract" or a "tort." The full
consequences of this kind of pigeonhole jurisprudence were not read-
ily apparent when the court first announced it in Lonzrick. The
actual holding of Lonzrick was to permit the plaintiff in that case to
recover in the "tort" pigeonhole what would have been available to
a plaintiff suing in the "contract" pigeonhole. Most applauded that
decision. Few, if any, realized that the opinion had planted the seeds
for more questionable results in the future. Those seeds bore fruit
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1 Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commerdal
Code, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 36 (1965) [now CASE W. RES. L. REV.).
2 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
3 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
4 Strict liability should be carefully distinguished from products liability based
on a seller's fault, such as negligence. This paper is confined to discussing the prob-
lems arising under strict (non-fault) theories of liability for defective products.
Typically, such strict liability has been based on a breach of a sales warranty arising
under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or on strict tort defined in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Ohio may be developing
yet a third theory of strict liability. For a discussion of this possibility, see text ac-
companying notes 17-34 infra
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in United States Fidelity, a case which graphically demonstrated the
impact of pigeonhole jurisprudence. Having decided that the
plaintiff's property damage claim belonged in the "tort" pigeonhole,
the court held that it was barred by a 2-year statute of limitations.
If, instead, the court had placed that claim in the "contract" pigeon-
hole, then plaintiff's suit would have been barred only after the 4-
year statute of limitations set out in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) bad run.6
Ohio may not be alone in using this kind of pigeonhole ap-
proach to decide strict products liability cases. Recent decisions
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court7 and the Tennessee federal
district court8 also seem to have accepted the idea, suggesting, per-
haps, a national judicial trend toward it. However, the Ohio deci-
sions are particularly express about the idea. They also raise some
rather unique problems about the scope and substance of the -two
pigeonholes. Further, the Ohio approach seems to be different
from that accepted by some authorities elsewhere which hold that
strict products liability law is not to be divided into "tort" and
"contract" components, but, instead, is always to be treated-as a mat-
ter of strict tortY Therefore, this Comment will emphasize the Ohio
story, although many of its points have application to and may prove
instructive to the situation now developing in otherstates.
I. DETERMINING THE PIGEONHOLES
A. The Resurgence of Privity
Obviously, it is critical to know how the court selects the ap-
propriate pigeonhole to govern the case. In legal areas beyond
5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1953).
0 UCC § 2-725 [Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (Page 1962)].
7 Local 57, IUOE v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 258 A.2d 271 (R.I. 1969).
s Bowling v. Ford Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 312 (E.D, Tenn. 1968).
9 The Ohio approach divides strict liability into "contract" and "tort" pigeonholes
depending upon whether privity exists. For a discussion of the role of privity, see text
accompanying notes 10-11 infra. Ohio's approach should be carefully distinguished from
some authorities elsewhere which suggest that strict liability cases for defective prod-
ucts re always "strict tort" matters irrespective of the presence or absence of privity.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment 1 (1965).
I have previously discussed and criticized the total eclipsing of the UCC war-
ranties by strict tort Among my points was that strict tort added little, if anything,
that was not possible under the UCC. See Shanker, supra note 1, at 21-30. See also
Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965). This paper limits itself t6
discussing the peculiar Ohio situation which might be said to be more like a partial
eclipse; that is, one part of strict liability is governed by "contract" (i.e., the UCC)
and the other by "tort," depending upon the presence or absence of privity.,
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strict products liability, the characterization of a suit typically de-
pends upon the defendant's acts. Thus, if the defendant acts in a
careless fashion, then the suit against him is called negligence.
If the defendant walks on property, then the suit against him is
called trespass. If a defendant does not perform a promise, then
the suit against him typically is called assumpsit or breach of con-
tract, etc. One might expect, therefore, that the categorization of a
suit within the strict products liability arena equally would depend
on what the defendant does. Curiously, that does not appear to be
the case. Instead, when strict liability for defective products is in-
volved, the suit characterization seems to depend upon who the
plaintiff is. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, if the injured
plaintiff is the one who purchased the defective goods from the
offending seller, i.e., is in "privity" with the seller, then the appro-
priate pigeonhole for the suit is "contract." However, all other
plaintiffs injured by the same defective goods are required to sue
that seller in the "tort" pigeonhole."° So, privity once again be-
comes a critical factor in Ohio in determining a seller's strict liabil-
ity for his defective products. In fact, an Ohio lawyer can come
dose to resolving his strict liability cases by the use of three easy-to-
apply equations, namely:
1. P (privity) = K (contract pigeonhole)
2. N.P. (nonprivity) - T (tort pigeonhole)
3. S.L. (seller's liability) = existence either of K or T = ex-
istence either of P or N.P.
Just what policy is served by treating a plaintiff in privity dif-
ferently from one not in privity is hard to fathom since the of-
fending seller seems to have acted exactly the same way in both
cases. Regardless of which plaintiff is involved, the seller's single
wrongful act was to inject defective goods into the stream of com-
merce. Notwithstanding, the extent of his liability for this single
fault will depend upon the happenstance of who those defective
goods happen to injure!
B. Warnings from History
The history of products liability law should warn that there may
be danger in making the privity doctrine the basis for determining
substantive rights of parties injured by defective products. Only a
10 See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio
St. 2d 244, 251, 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1970); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Co., 6 Ohio St.
2d 227,229,218 N.E.2d 185, 186 (1966).
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short time ago, it was the favorite judicial doctrine used to deny
recovery to large groups of persons injured by a seller's defective
products."1  More recent developments had suggested, however,
that the privity doctrine was on its way to oblivion.'2 In fact, the
Ohio Supreme Court was a leader in moving toward what appeared
to be an outright rejection and repudiation of it.' Those who
welcomed that leadership must be sorely disappointed because it
is now clear that the Ohio Supreme Court still recognizes that the
privity doctrine has important vitality. Perhaps, it will not be used,
as in yesteryear, completely to slam the door of recovery in the
face of a plaintiff injured by a defective product. However, United
States Fidelity makes dear that it will be used to determine whether
that recovery door will stay open for 2 or 4 years.
The Ohio Supreme Court's approach of determining a seller's
strict liability by a "tort" or "contract" pigeonhole, which in turn is
determined by privity, is not a welcome step. Indeed it is hard
to conceive what social purpose is served by distinguishing between
injured plaintiffs who sue the same defendant for the same wrong-
ful act of placing the same defective goods into the stream of
commerce, simply because one plaintiff is in privity and one is not.
Privity has caused much grief in the past. The Ohio Supreme
Court's present suggestion that it still has some kind of vitality in
Ohio is disappointing, and hopefully will be reconsidered.
II., SCOPE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE PIGEONHOLES
Until and unless the Ohio Supreme Court rejects the pigeonhole-
privity approach to strict products liability law, the bench and bar
are going to have to learn to live with it. Putting it more precisely,
lawyers and judges need to know the exact nature and substance of
each of the two pigeonholes within which an Ohio plaintiff injured
by defective goods may find himself.
11 For a list of commentators on the subject, see Shanker, supra note 1, at 6 n.2.
Perhaps the leading discussion on the subject is Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
L2 For a more recent look at the doctrine of privity, see Dickerson, The ABC's of
Products Liability - With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L.
REv. 439 (1969); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L REV. 791 (1966).
13 See Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583
(1965); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958). Even the precise holding of Lonzrick was moving in this direction.
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A. Statute of Limitations Dimension - The Irony of United States
Fidelity's Holding
The United States Fidelity case dealt with one of the dimen-
sions of the two products liability pigeonholes; namely, the statute
of limitations. Yet, despite its holding that strict liability in the
"tort" pigeonhole is limited to 2 years, manufacturer-sellers will
soon realize that they typically will remain liable for their defective
products for the full 4 years contemplated by section 2-725 of the
UCC, exactly as the plaintiff in United States Fidelity had urged.
The irony of the United States Fidelity decision is that it over-
looked the fact that a plaintiff need not necessarily sue the remote
manufacturer-seller who originally placed the defective goods in the
stream of commerce. Instead, that plaintiff could typically sue a
party in the distributive marketing chain closer to him, such as the
retailer, who handled the defective goods. After the retailer pays
the judgment to the injured plaintiff, the retailer could then sue to
recover his loss over from the wholesaler. In turn, the wholesaler
could then sue to recover over from the manufacturer whose orig-
inal sale of the defective goods actually caused the problem. 4 In
this last action between the wholesaler and manufacturer, the suit
will be between parties in privity with each other. As such, "con-
tract" will be the appropriate pigeonhole for this suit and the 4-
year UCC statute of limitations will apply. Thus, despite United
States Fidelity's adoption of a 2-year statute of limitations for "tort"
cases, the manufacturer-seller who originally placed the defective
goods in the stream of commerce typically' 5 will, as a result of this
14 This process comes about because each seller in the distributive marketing chain
typically makes some implied or express sales warranty at least to his immediate
buyer. For discussion of this process, see authorites cited notes 11-12 supra. By use
of third party practice under procedural rules comparable to Rule 14 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or vouching in principles similar to section 2-607(5) of the
UCC, this series of suits could be reduced to a single litigation.
15 1 say "typically" and not "invariably." Cases can arise where the seller will
avoid the full 4-year liability. An example would be where the injured party was not
a buyer, such as a member of the buyer's family, an employee of the buyer, or an inno-
cent bystander. Because a nonbuyer would not be in "privity of contract" with anyone,
in Ohio he would be placed in the "tort" pigeonhole and required to sue within 2 years.
Should he fail to do so, then the buyers within the vertical marketing chain would
suffer no loss requiring a suit over for reimbursement. Under such facts, the orig-
inal seller whose defective products caused the injury might actually be excused at the
end of the 2 years. This is what seems to have happened in Local 57, IUOE v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 258 A.2d 271 (R.I. 1969). When an offending seller gets out of the ful
4-year liability because of these fact patterns, there appears to me to be a windfall to the
offending seller to which he was not entitled.
One should also note situations where the 2-year tort statute of limitations will
give a plaintiff more time within which to sue than the 4-year limitation set out in
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series of lawsuits, continue to be responsible for them for the full 4
years contemplated by section 2-725 of the UCC. It, therefore,
makes little sense that that same seller should not be equally liable
for the same fall 4 years in a direct action by the remote (not in
privity) plaintiff who actually suffered the injury.
Nor can the seller complain about being held responsible for the
full 4-year period set out by the UCC, even though his defective
goods injured one not in privity with him. This length of liability
is exactly what the seller had to expect when he sold and delivered
the defective goods into the stream of commerce. The very fact of
his sale made the seller potentially liable for all of the consequences
imposed thereon by article 2 of the UCC, including its statute of
limitations,'" and no lawyer would dare advise him to expect less.
Surely, then, there is no reason to excuse the seller from the very
statutory liability which he had to be prepared to accept when he
sold the defective goods, simply because of the happenstance that
they injure a remote party rather than a direct party. To, suggest
otherwise is simply to let chance become the prime factor in deter-
mining the extent of a seller's liability for his defective products.
Products liability law certainly ought to be based on firmer stuff.
B. Other Dimensions of the Pigeonholes
What are the dimensions of the two strict products liability pi-
geonholes beyond the statute of limitations question? In particular,
what substantive duties does each impose upon a seller?
1. The "Tort" 'Pigeonhole Is It Strict Tort, Commercial
Code Warranty, or What?
a. Comparison With Strict Toit.- When the Ohio Supreme
section 2-725 of the UCC. This is because a "tort" action does not accrue until the ac-
tual injury, whereas section 2-725 in certain cases starts running upon delivery of the
goods. See Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1967), where a
plaintiff was permitted to sue the seller more than 24 years after he had sold the defective
product. But cf. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 46,291 N.Y.S.2d
94 (Sup. Ct. 1967), where the court stated that the cause of action in all cases should
accrue "at the time of sale and installation." There is also a possibility that the UCC
statute of limitations could be reduced below 4 years. For a discussion of such a re-
duction, see note 16 infra.
I0By agreement, individuals are permitted to reduce the limitations period to as
little as 1 year. UCC § 2-725 (1). Query: Would such an agreement bind individ-
uals not parties thereto? There are no cases on this question. However, by reason of
general contract principles -which supplement the UCC, I doubt that this question would
be answered in the affirmative. See UCC § 1-103. However, even if I am wrong, should
not the seller's expectations based on the interpretation of a lawfully enacted statute (the
UCC) determine his liability rather than the judicial privity doctrine?
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Court in Lonzrick first set up the "tort" pigeonhole, most probably
assumed that the court was establishing in Ohio the "strict tort" con-
cept described in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which was then being fast accepted by other courts of the country.
In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court actually cited section 402A of the
Restatement to "support" its position. 8 However, a more careful
study of Lonzrick and United States Fidelity makes one wonder
whether the Ohio Supreme Court does, in fact, intend to equate
the new Ohio "tort" with the "strict tort" defined in section 402A
of the Restatement. Interestingly, the court has never specifically
used the label "strict tort" to define the new Ohio "tort"; and there
appear to be significant differences between what the Restatement
has in mind for "strict tort" and what the court has in mind for the
new Ohio "tort."
One of the differences may relate to the defendants upon whom
the obligation is imposed. The Ohio Supreme Court so far has stated
that the Ohio "tort" duty is imposed only upon "manufacturer-
sellers."' 9  But, what about sellers who are not the manufacturer,
such as the wholesaler or retailer, who also handled and also sold
the defective goods? Will the Ohio "tort" duty also be imposed
upon them? The Restatement makes clear that "strict tort" is not
limited to manufacturers but equally applies to all sellers in the dis-
tributive chain, including wholesalers and retailers. 2° However, the
Ohio Supreme Court has yet to indicate that this will be so with
respect to the new Ohio "tort."
There are also significant differences between the Restatement's
description of the duty imposed by "strict tort" and how the court
describes the duty imposed by the new Ohio "tort." Section 402A
of the Restatement states that "strict tort" prohibits a seller from
"selling any product in a defective condition [which is) unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer." This is a far cry from
the language employed by the Ohio Supreme Court. It describes
the Ohio "tort" as an "implied warranty" based on an "implicit
representation" to sell products which are of "good and merchant-
17For commentary regarding the development of strict tort, see authorities cited
notes 11-12 supra.
18 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 239, 218 N.E.2d 185, 194
(1966).
19 Id. at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 188; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck &
Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 251, 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1970).
2 01RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965). See also
Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. 1969).
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able quality and fit for the intended use.''21  These words ("im-
plied warranty," "merchantable quality," and "fitness for intended
use") not only differ sharply from the "unreasonably dangerous"
words employed by the Restatement: They seem, in fact, almost to
be borrowed from the implied sales warranty sections of the UCC!
22
Thus, despite the label "tort," there is a distinct possibility that the
court intends to adopt UCC warranty ideas as the substantive
scope of the Ohio "tort." If, indeed, this is what the court has in
mind, then this clearly is at odds with what the Restatement had in
mind for "strict tort."
b. Comparison with Uniform Commercial Code Warran-
ties.- Assuming that the Ohio Supreme Court means to develop its
"tort" along the lines of the implied sales warranties of the UCC,
then there are serious questions as to which of the two possible UCC
implied warranties (i.e., implied warranty of merchantability, or
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose)14 is intended.
The court's use of the words "implied warranty" and "merchantable
quality" are dose to the words used in the UCC's implied war-
ranty of merchantability, suggesting that that is the warranty in-
tended. The trouble with this suggestion is the apparent dis-
crepancy between the court and the UCC in describing what
"merchantability" is all about. The court seems to be saying that
its "tort" of implied warranty of merchantable quality requires the
product to be "fit for intended use."" However, the UCC's im-
plied warranty of merchantability requires "fitness for ordinary pur-
poses."' " Whether the court's fitness for "intended use" and the
UCC's fitness for "ordinary purposes" are the same is yet unknown,
although there is a hint in Lonzrick that they may be.y
Another possible interpretation of the court's words "fitness for
intended use" is that the product must meet the specific and unique
21 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St.
2d 244, 251-52, 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1970). The Ohio Supreme Court used almost
identical language in Lonzrick. 6 Ohio St. 2d at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 188-89.
2 Section 2-314 of the UCC generally deals with the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility. Section 2-315 deals with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
23 see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment = (1965).
24 See note 22 supra.25 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio
St. 2d 244, 252, 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1970); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio
St. 2d 227, 230, 218 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1966).
26UCC § 2-314(2)(c).
27 In Lonvrick the court stated that the tort has an implied warranty that the
goods "were of good and merchantable quality, fit for their ordinary intended use."
6 Ohio St. 2d at 235,218 N.E.2d at 191 (emphasis added).
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needs of the particular user. If that is what the court intends,
then the Ohio "tort" would be rather dose to the UCC's implied
warranty requiring fitness for particular purpose.' Such an ap-
proach would place a heavy burden on a manufacturer. While a
manufacturer may be charged with the knowledge of the ordinary
use to which his goods might be put, he would rarely know the
specific and unique needs of a remote consumer with whom he
never dealt.
Which, if either, of the two UCC implied warranties the Ohio
court has in mind by using the words "merchantable quality" and
"fitness for intended use" is yet to be determined. Perhaps the
answer is that the Ohio "tort" will somehow combine ideas from
both the UCC's implied warranty of merchantability requiring fit-
ness for ordinary purpose and also the UCC's implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose, but just how is unknown.
More uncertainty about the nature of this new Ohio "tort"
develops by investigating its possible relationship to the UCC's ex-
press warranties.2" Both in Lonzrick3° and in United States Fidel-
ity, 1 the Ohio Supreme Court expressly approved its prior decision
in Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,32 and declared that that decision
fully supported its newly announced "tort" concept imposing upon
sellers an implied warranty. However, Inglis deliberately stated that
its holding was based on an express sales warranty theory, and that
where such an express warranty was present, then "there is no need
for the law to imply a warranty." 83 On the surface, the statements
made in Inglis regarding "express" warranties and their negating
"implied" warranties seem to be irreconcilable with the statements
made in Lonzrick and United States Fidelity setting up only an
"implied" warranty. Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court has twice stated
that these decisions support each other and somehow can be recon-
ciled. However, the specifics of this reconciliation are not clear.
A p6ssibility may be that the Ohio Supreme Court will overrule its
language in Inglis and accept the UCC approach that express and
28UCC § 2-315.
29 For provisions relating to express sales warranties, see UCC § 2-314.
30 6 Ohio St. 2d at 227, 218 N.E.2d at 185 (syllabus, para. 1).
3121 Ohio St. 2d at 251, 257 N.E.2d at 384.
32 3 Ohio St. 2d 132,209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
33 Id. at 140, 209 N.E.2d at 588. It is interesting to note that Inglis raised prob-
lems of its own internal consistency. Performing a feat of remarkable judicial gym-
nastics, the Inglis court relied upon diametrically opposing authorities to support its
holding. See Shanker, supra note 1, at 12-13 n.25.
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implied warranties are not inconsistent per se, but, in fact, are to be
construed as consistent and cumulative unless that would be unrea-
sonable.84
From the above, it is obvious that the exact substance and scope
of the new Ohio "tort" are not clear. However, in summary, the
following possibilities seem to exist.-
(1) As shown by the court's use of UCC warranty language,
the "tort" is defined essentially along the lines of one or more of the
UCC warranties. But, if that is what is intended, why does- the
court persist in calling the -action- a "tort"? Why not, instead, call
it a UCC warranty which simply has been- made available to remote
(not in privity) parties ?
(2) As shown by the, court's describing the action as a "tort,"
it is intended that the -liability be defined in 'accordance with the
"strict tort" principles found in section 402A of the Restatement.
But, if this is what is intended, why does the court consistently avoid
using the label "strict tort." 'And, why does the court avoid using
the language and concepts which the Restatement and other authori-
ties have used to describe "strict tort"?
(3) The court has in mind developing some, new strict liability
theory in Ohio which simply -is'-not known elsewhere. It will com-
bine in a mold yet to be deierxmined elements of the TCC's express
and implied warranties, perhaps elements of "strict tort," and maybe
some new ideas. '- I - - 1
(4) The court has gotten badly tangled ip with words. A new
and better defined approach will be developed.
Time alone will tell which of the above is intended by the
Ohio Supreme Court. ", I
2. Scope of the "Contract" Pigeonhole.- Where privity is pres-
ent, then the Ohio Supreme Court states that the strict products
liability pigeonhole in which to sue the seller is "contract." The
34UCC § 2-317.
35 The 1962 version of the UCC, which is in force in Ohio, permits the courts to
make the Code warranties available to those not in privity with,the seller. See UCC
§ 2-313, comment 2; id. § 2-318, comment 3. Compare alternative C of the 1966
version of section 2-318 of the UCC, wherein privity can also-be eliminated by legislative
action. Some have argued that the 1962 version of the UCC permits the judicial elim-
ination of privity only in the vertical line but not in the horizontal chain. See Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 251,-218 N.E.2d 185, 201 (1965) (Taft., C.J.,
dissenting). For criticism of this position, see Shanker, supra note 1, at 25. See also
Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964). For a discussion
and collection of cases where privity was judicially eliminated for nonbuyers in thie hori-
zontal chain, see Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 406 (D.C. Cir.,
Mar. 6, 1970).
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scope of this "contract" pigeonhole seems better defined than the
"tort" pigeonhole. Apparently, the court intends that the scope
and substantive aspects of the "contract" pigeonhole be essentially
the same as the warranty liabilities found in article 2 of the UCC.38
One might wish that the court would directly state that fact;
namely, that the suit of a plaintiff who is in privity with the seller
is based on the UCC. Stating, instead, that it is a "contract" action
may lead to the erroneous notion that the seller's liabilities are those
determined under common law principles of contract. Referring to
a "contract" action perhaps made a great deal of sense when one
was talking about lawsuits brought under the old Uniform Sales Act
which was little more than a codification of common law contract
law. And, in fact, the Lonzrick case, where the court first men-
tioned the "contract" language, was decided under the former Uni-
form Sales Act and prior to the enactment of the UCC. However,
now that the UCC is the law of Ohio, it is not precise to describe
actions brought thereunder as sounding in "contract." As I stated
previously:
So Article 2, the Sales article of the Commercial Code, is much
more than an exercise in logic of common law principles applied
to sales contracts. Indeed, basic common law notions are often
rejected outright and replaced by new ones. When found useful,
even doctrines developed beyond the law of contract were written
into Article 2 [specific illustrations citedJ.
... [Tihe above demonstrates that the Commercial Code's ap-
proach to sales law was a far different one than that of the Uni-
form Sales Act. Perpetuating the common law logic of contracts
and its concomitant doctrines about the unrestrained freedom to
contract was not the Code's only concern. Sensible commercial
practice and fair dealing with consumers were also important ob-jectives.37
Thus, if one is to be precise about it, the theory of an action
brought under the UCC is not "contract" as that term has been
historically understood. Quite true, there is involved a contract of
sale which brings the UCC into action. However, the method by
which that contract was formed and the liabilities which stem
therefrom are not necessarily based on pure common law contract
principles. It is better to recognize that a buyer's action against a
seller under the UCC is a statutory action; that is, one grounded on
a statute which actually repealed and replaced many common law
"contract" principles.
30 See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio
St. 2d 244, 251, 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1970).
37 Shanker, supra note 1, at 21.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Insisting that there is a distinction between an action under the
UCC and an action in "contract" is not simply to quibble about
words. Failure to make this distinction can at best lead to confu-
sion and at worst lead to injustice. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme
Court's fascination with the word "contract" may be the reason that
it resurrected the privity doctrine to determine the substantive
rights of plaintiffs in strict products liability cases. Having fo-
cused upon the word "contract," it was easy enough to fall into
the trap of reasoning that contract benefits can be made available
only to those who are parties, i.e., in privity, to it. Logically,
therefore, those not in privity to the contract must find a remedy,
if they have one, in some other theory, like "tort."
This kind of natural legal logic, in which the "privity" doctrine
and "contract" actions are associated with each other, has a strong
historical pull on the legal mind. It is exactly the premise on which
the former Uniform Sales Act was written and largely interpieted.
However, perpetuating this kind of historical legal logic certainly
is not what the UCC intended.38 It certainly was not wedded to
any privity doctrine, no matter how logical privity may appear to be
and historically was to a "contract" action. Indeed, both with re-
spect to privity and many other matters, a great deal can be done
under the UCC which never was possible nor logical under contract
law. 9
III. SUMMARY AND FINAL COMMENT
Should not the obvious be recognized? When a seller sells
goods, he has no choice but to recognize and accept' the fact that
the sale and its concomitant liabilities are those found in. the UCC.
No lawyer would dare advise that a seller could ignore the very
statute which was enacted to deal directly with his sales transac-
tions. If the seller happens to sell defective goods, then who they
may injure is often a matter of chance. One day, luck will have it
that the injury will be to the party who directly bought the goods
from the seller, i.e., the party in privity with the seller. On an-
other day, the injury will be to a party not in priviy. It is hard to
accept the Ohio Supreme Court's suggestion that one of these plain-
tiffs should have a different set of rights than the other. Both were
3 8 For further discussion of the historical problems raised by carrying the word
"contract" to its logical extreme, see Shanker, supra note 1, at 20.
39 See Shanker, supra note 1, at 1; Speidel, supra note 9, at 804. See also Franklin,
When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases,
18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966).
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injured by the same defective goods and both are suing the same
seller for the same wrongful act of injecting those defective goods
into the stream of commerce. Indeed, just what useful social pur-
pose is served by developing this dichotomy between plaintiffs is
equally hard to fathom. What is more, through a series of law-
suits, the seller who first delivered the defective goods typically
will have to face up to all the liabilities which the UCC imposed
upon him. If this can be accomplished by the indirect route of sev-
eral suits, then it should be equally possible with a direct suit by
the plaintiff who actually suffered the injury against the defendant
who originally, caused it.
There may well arise a curious set of circumstances whereby the
original seller will somehow avoid the full impact of the liabilities
imposed upon him by the UCC because of the pigeonhole-privity
jurisprudence which the Ohio Supreme Court is now pursuing.4"
Should this happen, then the offending seller simply gets a wind-
fall to.which he ought not be entitled. The very fact of the orig-
inal sale required the seller to accept and expect all the liabilities im-
posed by article 2 of the UCC. .A pigeonhole-privity theory of juris-
prudence should not be the escape hatch from them.
In 1965, I wrote:
To continue to press a jurisprudence which emphasizes pigeon-
holes and eclipses is to ignore history. It is submitted that such ajurisprudence can assure only continued confusion and injustice in
the law of products liability where confusion and injustice have
already reigned too long.41
I now repeat that statement.
4 0 See note 15 supra.
41 Shanker, supra note 1, at 11.
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